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ABSTRACT (BAHASA MELAYU) 
 
Banyak kajian telah dijalankan bagi melihat implikasi struktur tadbir urus 
korporat terhadap prestasi syarikat. Walaupun penemuan hasil kajian terdahulu tidak 
sebulat suara dalam kesimpulan mereka, majoriti bersetuju bahawa terdapat 
hubungan yang signifikan antara struktur/mekanisme tadbir urus dan prestasi firma. 
Kajian ini dijalankan adalah bertujuan untuk mengkaji kesan, jika ada, terhadap 
mana-mana mekanisme tadbir urus korporat, terutamanya struktur pemilikan 
korporat, struktur ahli Lembaga Pengarah, dan pakej emolumen ke atas prestasi 
syarikat-syarikat dagangan awam yang besar di Malaysia. Tidak banyak kajian 
dilaksanakan di Malaysia mengenai hubung kait prestasi syarikat dan parameter 
tadbir urus syarikat yang multidimensi. Kajian ini menggunakan sampel syarikat-
syarikat yang tersenarai di Pasaran Utama Bursa Malaysia, khususnya dalam sektor 
hartanah dan perladangan, dengan meneliti impak pemantauan oleh pelabur institusi, 
saiz dan tahap kebercualian ahli Lembaga Pengarah, serta emolumen eksekutif, ke 
atas prestasi firma menggunakan mekanisme pengukuruan Tobin’s Q, pulangan ke 
atas aset (ROA) dan pulangan ke atas ekuiti (ROE). Hasil keputusan menunjukkan 
bahawa terdapat hubungan yang signifikan tetapi lemah antara mekanisme tadbir 
urus korporat, terutamanya struktur ahli Lembaga Pengarah dan emolumen eksekutif 
dengan prestasi syarikat. Keputusan tersebut juga menunjukkan bahawa terdapat 
faktor-faktor lain yang mempengaruhi kadar keuntungan dan prestasi syarikat. Walau 
bagaimanapun, tahap pematuhan Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Malaysia adalah tinggi 
di kalangan syarikat-syarikat awam yang terlibat. 
 
v 
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) 
 
Numerous studies have looked at the implications of corporate governance 
structures on company performance. Although the literature is not unanimous in its 
conclusions, the weight of opinion is that there is a significant relationship between 
governance mechanisms and structures and firm performance. The aim of this 
research is to study the effect, if any of corporate governance mechanisms, 
particularly corporate ownership structure, corporate board, and compensation 
packages, on the performance of Malaysian public listed companies. The literature 
on these multidimensional governance parameters on firm performance in the 
context of Malaysia is lacking. Using sample of large publicly traded Malaysian 
companies, in particular in the properties and plantations sectors, this research 
examine the effect of institutional investor monitoring, board size and independence, 
and executive compensation on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q, return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Results show that there is significant 
but weak relationship between corporate governance mechanisms in particular 
corporate board structure and executive compensation, with company performance. 
These findings suggest that there are other factors which have larger influence on the 
profitability and performance of companies. Nevertheless, the level of compliance 
with the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance is high among the public listed 
companies.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 The governance of companies has been the subject of increasing interest in 
recent years. It has been one of heavily discussed topics in both the business and 
academic fields. The main focus of the debates concerns on how to appropriately 
structure the organization and put into place good governance mechanisms that will 
provide the most effective decision-making process as part of the top managers’ 
roles, particularly the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), and effective monitoring 
system mainly by the Board of Directors (BODs), which in turn will boost the 
performance of the organizations (Coles, McWillimas, and Sen, 2001). 
 
The revelation of corporate misdoings, unethical procedures and management 
excesses which caused the demise of large corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, 
Global Crossing, Adelphia Communications, Tyco and Xerox (Porwal and Kumar, 
2003; Teng, Aun, and Fook, 2011), have further pressured the calls for greater 
corporate governance around the world, including Malaysia. A number of reports and 
journals have been published to improve the governance standards which called for 
greater transparency and accountability in areas such as executive contracts and 
compensation, boards structure and operations, and the establishment of board 
monitoring committees (Abdullah, 2006a and 2006b; Abdul Wahab, How, and 
Verhoeven, 2008; Grinstein and Chhaochharia, 2009; Ross, 2004). These calls were 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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